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Abstract

attacks cun be launched with little effort. Presently,
it is difficult to trace an attack uack to its originator.

This paper analyzes a network-based denial of service attack for IF (Inteme.t Protocol) based networks.
It is popularly called SYN flooding. It works by an
attacker sending many TCP (1ransmission Control
Protocol) COIlllection requests with spoofed source addresses to a victim's machine. Each single request
causes the targeted host to instantiate data structures out of a limited pool of resources. Once the target host's resources are exhausted, no more incoming
TCP connections can be established, thus denying
further legitimate access.

Several possible solutions to this attack have been
proposed by others, und some implemented. We have
developed an active monitoring tool that classifies IP
source addresses with high probability as being falsified or genuine. Our approach finds connection establishment protocol messages that are coming from
forged IP addresses, and takes actions to ensure that
the resulting illegitimate half-open connections arc
reset immediately.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes backgroWld material, such as the IP and TCP
protocols. Section 3 explains the SYN flooding attack. Section 4 discusses existing approaches to solve
this problem, such as configuration improvements
and firewall-based approaches. The technical details
of our approach are described in Section 5, followed
by a performance evaluation in Section 6. Sections 7
and B outline future work issues and present conclusions.

The paper contributes a detailed analysis of the
SYN flooding attack and a discussion of existing and
proposed countermeasures. Furthermore, we introduce a new solution approach, explain its design, and
evaluate its perfonnance. Our approach offers protection against SYN flooding for all hosts connected
to the same local area network, independent of their
operating system or networking stack implementation. It is highly portable, configurable, extensible,
and neither requires special hardware, nor modifications in routers or protected end systems.
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Background

We will provide a brief description of the features of
the TCP lIP protocol suite that facilitate this attack.
For further details see [2, 15, 16].

Introduction

Since September 1996, several dozen sites on the In·
ternet have been subjected to a denial of service at· 2.1 Internet Protocol
tack, popularly called SYN Flooding [4, 5, 19]. The
attack exploits weaknesses in the TCP lIP (TI-ans- The Internet Protocol (IP) is the standard network
mission Control Protocoll Internet Protocol) protocol layer protocol of the Internet that provides an unrelisuite. This cannot be corrected without significant able, connection-less, best-effort packet delivery sermodifications to its protocols. These denial of service vice. IP defines the basic unit of data transfer used
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throughout an IF nc~work, caJled a datagram. The
service is 1Lnreliable, because ~he delivery of datagrams is no~ guaranteed. Datagrams may be lost,
duplicated, delayed, or delivered out of order. IF is
connection.lcss, because each packet is ~reated independently of others - each may travel over different
paths and some may be lost while others are delivered. IF provides bcst-cfforldeJivery, because packets
are not discarded unless resources are exhausted or
underlying networks fail. Datagrams are routed towards their destination. A set of rules characterize
how hosts and gateways should process packets, how
and when errOr messages should be generated, and
when packets should be discarded.

2.2

S

D

SYN,

LISTEN

ACK

Transmission Control Protocol

r---'-'::::.:'----------~J

To ensure reliable communications for applications
and services that need them, the 1ransmission Control Protocol (TCP) is available. It resides between IF
and the application layer. TCP provides a reliable,
connection-oriented data stream delivery service. As
long as there is link layer communication between
two communicating endpoints, TCP guarantees that
datagrams will be delivered in order, without errors,
and without duplication. It provides these services
by using flow control mechanisms, such as the sliding
window protocol, and adaptive retransmission techniques.
2.2.1

The second message, from D to SI' has both the SYN
and ACK flags set indicating that D acknowledges
the SYN and is continuing the handshake. The third
message, from Si to D has its ACK bit set, and is an
indication to D that both hosts agree that a connection has been established. The third message may
contain user payload data.

CONNECtED

Figure 2: Three-way Handshake
The three-way handshake also initializes ~he sequence numbers for a new connection between Si and
D. Sequence numbers are needed by the TCP protocol to enable reliable packet delivery and retransmission. Si sends an initial sequence number x with
the first datagram: SYNz . In the second message D
acknowledges the first datagram with ACK z + 1 and
sends its own sequence number y: SYN y . So acknowl·
edges D's packet in the finaJ message of the three-way
handshake: ACKy+l'

Three-way Handshake

2.2.2

TCP Data Structures

For any TCP connection, under BSD style network
code, there are three memory structures that need
'A - attacker
to be allocated by both endpoints (See [18]). The
Si - source
M - monitor
socket structure (socket) holds information related
D - destination G - gateway
to the local end of the communication link: protocol
used, state information, addressing information, connection queues, buffers and Hags. TCP uses the InFigure 1: Generic network topology
ternet protocol control block s~ructure (inpcb) at the
Before data can be transmitted between a source host transport layer to hold infonnation such as TCP state
Si and a destination host D, TCP needs to establish information, IP address information, port numbers,
a connection between SI and D (see Figure 1). The IP header prototype and options, and a pointer to the
connection establishment process is called the threc- routing table entry for the destina~ion address. The
way handshake (see Figure 2). The first step in the TCP Control Block structure (tcpcb) contains TCP
process is a SYN1 packet that is sent from 5; to D. specific information such as timer information, sequence number information, How control status, and
''rep packet types are distinguished by flag bilS (e.g., SYN· out-of-band data. The combined size of these data

chronize, ACKnowledgment, ReSeT) set in the TCP header
code field. In the remainder of the paper we will abbreviate
'rCP control packets by referring to the flngs set in their code

field, e.g., SYNinstead of TCP Cllntrol datagrnm
bit set in its code field.
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Wi!ll

tile SYN

Operating System
FreeBSD 2.1.5
Linux 1.2.x
Solaris 2.4
Solaris 2.5.1
SunOS 4.x
Windows NTs 3.51
Windows NTw 4.0

Backlog
n.a.

Backlog + Grace

10

10
n.a.
n.a.
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32

the tcpcb exists, but the TCP state machine is
not in the LISTEN state, the server will discard
the packet, but will not send an RST (this would,
for example, be the case when the server is just
coming up, but has not yet started listening).

128

5
6
6

8
4. If the SYN packet arrives for a socket that is
in the LISTEN state, the above mentioned data
structures will be allocated. However, the server
will also set a flag indicating that it will destroy
the connection and associated memory structures if it encounters an error. If the backlog
queue is full, the server will consider this an error and will terminate the connection.

6
6

Table 1: Backlogs for some Operating Systems
structures for a single TCP connection may typically
exceed 280 bytes.
Different versions of Unix use different data structures and schemes of allocation, but for the purpose
of this discussion, it is sufficient to understand that
every TCP connection establishment requires an allocation of significant memory resources.

2.2.3

5. The packet will be ignored if it contains an RST.
If it contains an ACK, it will be discarded and an
RST sent to the other side. The packet will be
discarded if the SYN bit is not set. Otherwise,
the server copies information, such as the client's
address information, into a buffer, connects its
tcpcb to the client, and initializes its initial send
sequence (ISS) number y.

TCP Connection Establishment

When a SYN arrives at a port on which a TCP server
is listening, the above-mentioned data structures are
allocated. There is a limit on the number of concurrent TCP connections that can be in a half-open
connection state, called the SYN.RECVD state (i.e.,
SYN received - see Appendix A). Not enforcing tIns
limit would lead to a different denial of service attack:
an attacker could request so many connections that
the target machine's memory is completely exhausted
by allocating data structures for half-open TCP connections. When the maximum number of half-open
connections per port is reached (see Table 1, [6]),
TCP discards all new incoming connection requests
until it has either cleared or completed some of the
half-open connections. Overall system resources are
usually sufficient for several ports to be flooded.

6. The server now sends the second message of the
three-way handshake (SYNz+l and ACK y ) to
the client. The state changes to SYN ..RECVD.
A connection establishment timer is started for
this half-open connection. The connection remains in the SYN...R.ECVD state until either an
ACK (the third message of the handshake) is received or until the timer expires. This timer is
usually set to 75 seconds. During this period
of time retransmissions of the first and second
message of the three-way handshake may occur.
When the timer expires, all memory structures
associated with the connection are deallocated,
and the server goes back to the LISTEN state.

The TCP connection establishment process can be
described as a state machine. Detailed below is what
happens from the point of view of the destination
machine (server):

3
3.1

The SYN Flooding Attack
The Attack

1. A packet arrives at the destination machine As mentioned above, TCP implementations are dewhen the TCP state machine is in the LISTEN signed with a small limit on how many half-open constate.
nections per port are possible at any given time. An
attacker
A initiates a SYN flooding attack by send2. If the datagram checksum is incorrect, the packet
ing
many
connection requests with spoofed source adwill be discarded, and the client is expected to
dresses
to
the victim machine D. That causes D to
retransmit it.
allocate resources as explained in Section 2.2.3 and,
3. The tcpcb associated with the connection is once the limit of half-open connections is reached,
searched for. If it is not found, the server will to refuse all successive connection establishment atdiscard the packet and will send an RST (i.e.) tempts - in particular legitimate attempts (see Figinform the client that it reset the connection). If ure 3). It is important to note that neither outgoing
3

connection attempts nor connections that are already
established are affected by this attack.

are very slow in response, virtually or physically disconnected, or down. We classify three possible modes
of source address allocation: The attacker can be using a single address, a short list of addresses, or no
list at al1 2 .

D

A

LISTEN

Nonexistent spoofed SYN

~:;~?~=

SYN..RECVD

SYN+ACK

r

.
Port flooding occurs

Single address: The attack scripts published in the
hacker magazines Phrack [6] and 2600 [8] take as
a parameter a single spoofed address that is used
as the source address of all SYN packets. In the
absence of any defense, this mode of attack is as
effective as the other three modes described.
Short list: An attacker can generate a small pool of
addresses and use them as source addresses to
generate SYN packets.

Figure 3: A system under attack

No list: The attacker can use a different, randomly
generated source address for each successive
batch of SYN packets.

This condition exists until either the timer expires,
or some connections are completed or reset. If the
timer expires for a particular half-open connection,
the host will reset the connection and release all resources allocated for it.

4

Solutions

If a spoofed SYN packet contains the source ad~
dress of a reachable IP host Si, that host will receive In our opinion a good solution should have the folthe second message of the three-way handshake gen- lowing characteristics:
erated by D. Not expecting a SYN+ACK without
• independence of operating system and network
having requested a connection, Si will send a RST
stack implementation of the protected end syspacket to D, and consequently cause D to reset the
tems
connection. It is therefore in the interest of an attacker to forge source addresses that do not belong
• no requirement for IP or TCP protocol modifito hosts that are reachable from the victim D.
cations
If the attacker wants the denial of service condition
• capability to protect sets of machines, and not
to last longer than the timeout period, he needs to
only a single machine
continuollsly keep requesting new connections from
the victim machine. The amount of CPU and net• no special hardware reqnirements
work bandwidth required by an attacker for a sus• portability
tained attack is negligible.

The basis of the attack is that TCP lIP does not offer strong authentication on its control packets. Furthermore there is a requirement for an inappropriately burdensome allocation of memory and computation resources on the target side.

3.2

• extensibility
• configurability
The countermeasures described in this section have
been proposed by others to date. None of these proposals provides all the characteristics we are looking
for.

Different Attack Modes

Typical SYN flooding attacks can vary several pa4.1 Configuration Optimization
rameters: the number of SYN packets per source address sent in a batch (=: batch-size), the delay beThere are several ways of reducing the likelihood and
tween successive batches (=: delay), and the mode of
effects of an attack that involve changes in the consource address allocation (=: mode).
figurations of end systems and routers.
We consider only source addresses of hosts that are
2\Ve list the "single address" mode separately, because it
not reachable from D, be it because the addresses are rcpresenls an important special case of the "lisL of addres.~es"
not yet allocated, assigned, or the associated hosts mode.

4

4.1.1

4.2

System Configuration Improvements

Infrastructure Improvements

To defend against the exhaustion of resources in
the systems under attack, an obvious approach is
to increase the number of resources devoted to halfopen TCP connections, and to reduce the timeouts.
These measures have been suggested by different
sources [11], and can be summarized as:

Router configurations can be improved if the address spaces reachable over their various interfaces
arc disjoint and well-defined [9]. This is the case for
routers that attach an organization or a local ISP
to a backbone network. The address prefixes sepa·
rate the inside and the ouL~ide. An example where
this scheme is deployed is the international telephone
1. Reduce the timeout period from the default to a system. Phone number assignment is based on the
short time, e.g., 10 seconds. This helps in prun- geographical location of the end system.
ing half·open connections from the TCP queue.
Currently, there are practical problems for this ap2. Significantly increase the length of the backlog proach to work: in general, routers in large backqueue from the default (see Table 1). This makes bone networks with complex topology cannot make
the system able to cope with morC! simultaneous a clear distinction between inbound and outbound
half-open connections than before.
traffic. Packets are routed in backbones based on current
link availability and load and can take numerous
3. Disable non-essential services, thus reducing the
possible
paths through the network. Genuine packets
number of ports that can be attacked.
from the same source address can reach a baekbone
These measures help in dealing with attacks, but router legitimately over various interfaces.
also have severe shortcomings:
As long as a significant number of sites can transmit packets into the backbone networks without any
1. Lowering the timeouts may deny legitimate acsource address checking, hosts are still subject to uncess for machines to which the round trip times
traceable attacks. Therefore, additional backbone
exceed the timeout period.
mechanisms should be implemented to cope with a
2. Increasing the backlog leads to a potential in- large number of network based attacks.
crease in resource usage. One vendor recomThe implementation and deployment of a scheme
mends upgrading systems to a minimum of to cryptographically sign IP source addresses of all
128 MB RAM to allow them to cope with at· packets would allow tracing the physical transmistacks.
sion path of any IP packet to its source. Although
this wouldn not prevent SYN Aooding, the threat of
tracing and subsequent prosecution should serve as a
4.1.2 Router Configuration Improvements
deterrent to at least casual attacks. In this case, onThe measures proposed in the first reactions to the re- line tracing mechanisms are especially useful, because
cent attacks [4J, as well as several other sources [1, 9], a successful SYN flooding attack requires sustained
attempt to make it difficult for packets with spoofed network activity. The Internet infrastructure lacks
source addresses to traverse routers. The solutions basic mechanisms that have been present and suc~
proposed can be summarized as follows:
cessfully used in telephone networks for a long time.
1. Configure external interfaces on routers to block
packets that have source addresses from the in- 4.3
ternal network.
2. Configure internal router interfaces to block
packets to the outside that have source addresses
from outside the internal network. This limits
the ability to launch a SYN flooding attack from
that network, because the attacker would only be
able to generate packets with internal addresses.

Connection
provements

Establishment

Im-

This solution addresses the fact that TCP imposes
asymmetric memory and computation requirements
on the two endpoints during each connection establishment process. The destination host needs to allocate large data structures in response to any SYN
packet, without any guarantee of its authenticity.

These measures can be effective, but only if taken
The three-way handshake requires the sequence
in large scale. As more Internct Scroice Providers number y to match between the second and third
(ISPs) configure their routers appropriately, the fer- message to protect against accidentally reopened old
tile b'Tound for launching SYN flooding attacks may connections and unauthorized access (see [3]). The
be reduced.
destination therefore needs to either store its ISS y
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between sending the second message and recelvmg
the third message, or be able to regenerate y at the
time the third message of the three-way handshake is
received. If there were no mechanism to regenerate
y and the destination didn't store y, any host could
establish a connection by sending only the third message.

anism is put in place to deal with SYN flooding.
The drawbacks of this approach are delays on every
packet for additional processing. Not every firewall
product is capable of adding functionality, such as a
module to protect against SYN flooding.
The two main approaches are described below.

One such mechanism is to calculate y as a cryptographic hash value of source and destination IF 4.4.1 Firewall as a Relay
addresses, ports, the source's ISS x, and a destination specific secret key. D would calculate y in that In this approach, when a packet for an internal host
manner and use it in its SYN+ACK message. At is received the firewall answers on its behalf. Onlyafthe time D received the third message of the three- ter the three-way handshake is successfully completed
way handshake it can recalculate yl by using its se- does the firewall contact the host and establish a seccret key, sequence number, the addresses, and the ond connection.
ports found in that message. If y' matches the y in
ACK y +1 , the connection is legitimate, otherwise it is
1. In the case of an attack (see Figure 4), the firenot. Note that this solution also provides some prowall answers to the SYN sent by the attacker.
tection against sequence number prediction ([3]), beBecause the final ACK never arrives, the firewall
cause of the statistical properties of good hash functerminates the connection, and the host never retions.
ceives the datagram. This mode of protection is
only effective if the firewall itself is not vulnera·
Although this approach prevents the SYN floodble to SYN flooding.
ing attack, it has considerable drawbacks. This solution requires the modification of the TCP stanA
Firewall
D
dard and consequently every TCP implementation.
It is impossible to provide the fault tolerance that
SYNx
TCP currently offers without the destination keeping
state about each half-open connection. Furthermore,
this mechanism makes it impossible for the source
SYN+ACK
to include data in the third message of the threeway handshake, because x needs to be part of the
hash function argument. As there are only 232 TCP
sequence numbers, this technique introduces a small
probability that an old or a single forged packet might
open a connection. Section 4.4.1 discusses an ex-ten- Figure 4: Attack scenario with a relay-firewall protection
sion of this approach.

As many sites connected to the Internet are already
somewhat protected by firewalls, it makes sense to
try to use firewalls to protect against SYN flooding. Several firewall vendors have already made products available to increase protection against the attacks [13, 14], and some other solutions have been
proposed.

2. In the case of a legitimate connection (Figure 5),
after the firewall receives the final ACK, it creates a new connection to the internal host on
behalf of the original client. This makes the protected machines vulnerable to the new degradation of service attack described in Section 2.2.3.
Once the connection is established, the firewall
has to keep acting as a prox"}' to translate the sequence numbers in the packets that flow between
the client and the server.

Firewall-based protection approaches are based on
the idea that every packet destined to a host inside
the firewall has to be examined by the firewall first,
and thus decisions can be made on its authenticity
and actions can be taken to protect the internal hosts.
This can be effective if, apart from the normal blocking done by the firewall, some other specialized mech-

This method has the drawback of introducing new
delays for legitimate connections. Delays are introduced by ex-tra processing done at the firewall, both
at connection establishment time and for each data
packet. The obvious advantage is that the destination host never receives spoofed SYN packets.

4.4

Firewall Approach
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S

D

Firewall

ACK after some (arguably shor~) period of time,
i~ will send a RST packe~, terminating the connection.

SYN

A

SYN+ACK

SYN

ACK

SYN

,

--1

SYN+~AEcC,!<K~~ _ _

SYN+ACK
- __ J{at.a___

D

Firewall

ACK

~;;.
~

____ p_a~ _ ~

,
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Data
________
c.

.,,",,-Sequence
number
conversion

Figure G: Attack with semi-transparent gateway firewall protection
2. In the case of a legitimate connection (Figure 7)
~he firewall generates and sends an ACK packet.
When the legitimate ACK packet arrives, the
firewall lets it pass, and ~he "duplicate" ACK
packet arrives at the host. TCP is designed
to cope with duplicate packets, so the duplicate
packe~ is silently discarded. Now data can flow
freely in bo~h directions, without further firewall
intervention.

Fib'UI"C 5: Legitimate connedion with a relay-firewall
protection

An alternative approach in which the firewall could
predict the sequence number that is going to be used
by the host (see Section 4.3) would allow the firewall
to intervene in the same manner when establishing
the connection, without the need for translating sequence numbers for each data packet.
4.4.2

S

D

Firewall
"'~

Firewall as a Semi-transparent Gateway

SYN+ACK

In. this approach, the firewall lets SYN and ACI(
packets go through, but monitors the traffic and reacts to it. We call this the semi-transparent gateway
approach.

ACK

--- --- -ACK
-

-.",..

--- --Data- -- - ---- ------ - ...::::----- ----- - ---

The firewall passes SYN packets destined to internal hosts. When the host responds with a SYN+ACK
packet, the firewall forwards i~, bu~ reacts by generating and sending an ACK packe~ that seems to come
from the client. This has the effec~ of moving the
connection out of ~he backlog queue in the hos~, thus
freeing the resources that were allocated for the half·
open connection.

- - -:>-

Data

Figure 7:
Legitimate connection with
transparent gateway firewall protection

1. In the case of an attack (see Figure 6), when
~he host sends ~he SYN+ACK, the gateway lets
i~ pass and generates and sends the ACK ~hat
moves the connection out of the backlog queue.
If the firewall has no~ received the legitimate

semi-

The main advantage of this approach over the previous one is that no delays are introduced for legi~
imate connections once they are established. The
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price to pay is a large number of illegitimate open
connections at the destination if it is under attack.
However, the limit on the number of open connections is much higher on most systems (in the order
of thousands, limited only by the CPU and memory
resources available at the host), so it is an extra load
that most server class systems can withstand without many problems. Again, this approach requires
the timeout period to be very carefully selected, so
as to not deny access to legitimate hosts with long
response times.

5

Active Monitor -

or administratively configured as perfect Or evil
(see Section 5.1.2)
• a decision process based on a state machine to
determine correct state membership and actions
(see Section 5.1.3).

A

M

D

SYN
RST

synkill
SYN+ACK

1

We have developed a software tool that eilll lessen the
impact of SYN flooding attacks, and in many cases
defeat attacks completely. It provides all characteristics as described in Section 4.

5.1

Figure 8: Attack scenario: synkill generates RST
packet in response to bad or evil IF source addresses.
The connection at D is immediately moved into the
CLOSED state and resources are released.

Description

The program requires the ability to monitor and inject network traffic to and from the machines it is
protecting. Ethernet is an example for a networking
technology that satisfies this requirement. The pro-gram is called a monitor, because it reads and examines all TCP packets on the LAN after setting its network interface into promiscuous mode. The program
is called active, because it can generate TCP packets
in response to observed traffic and inject them into
the network. In the following sections we will refer to
the algorithm, and its implementation as synkill.

A

M

D

SYN

r---''''::.---j------~J

CONNECTED

RST
5.1.1

LISTEN

Algorithm

----~
CLOSED

The synkill algorithm classifies the source IF ad·
dresses of TCP packets as never seen (=; null), belonging to correctly behaving (=: good) hosts, as po- Figure 9: Attack scenario: synkill sends an ACK
tentially spoofed addresses (=: new), or as most cer· packet to complete the connection. After cxpirrJ has
tainly spoofed addresses (=: bac£). This classification passed, synkill generates a RST.
is based on observed network traffic and administraThe program can take two possible actions:
tively supplied input. Addresses that are administratively configured as good (bad) are called perfect
• Synkill sends RST packets whenever it observes
(evil).
connection establishment attempts from imposSynkill performs several processing steps on evsible, bad, or evil IF addresses or networks (See
ery TCP packet that is observed on the local area
Figures 8, 9, and 11). The purpose of this action
network, and handles asynchronous events, such as
is to release the resources allocated at the destiadministrative input and timer expirations. TCP
nation machine for connection establishments.
packet processing can be divided into:
• Synkill completes TCP connections by gener• address prefiltering, where the program classifies
ating the third message of the three-way handthe observed address as impossible, unassigned,
shake, and sending it to the destination (See Fig8

M

S

D

S

M

D

SYN
SYN

-..
SYN+ACK
~

- - -- -ACK
-

--

~ SYN+A....."
,.,
E'Pi

-~

..,: ,... AtCK

LISTEN
SYN_RECVD

4

ACK-

---

--~

CONNEcrED

RST

--- --- -

-~

CLOSED

~=t~~TOOI'"
.' ' J.-.

ACK

-..

RST

:

Figure 10: Normal access scenario: synkill generates and sends an ACK packet to complete the pending connection. The "duplicate" ACK from the original source A reaches D later and is ignored.

:

Figure 11: Normal access scenario: the connection
delay between a valid source machine and the destination is large. Synkill will generate a RST too
early if the expiry timer value is not chosen carefully!

mes 9, 10, and 11). The purpose of this action is to move a connection quickly from the

SYNJillCVD to the CONNECTED state. This sOUTce address of each TCP packet is examined to de:is useful if synkill considers the connection es- termine the set membership of the address (null, new,

bad, or goor!). Null addresses <lIe not saved C)"-l'licitly,
because it is not practical to keep data structures for
all possible IF addresses. If an address is not present
in the database, it is considered to be in state null.

tablishment attempt to be illegitimate. Tills approach is similar to the semi-transparent gateway solution described in Section 4.4.2 and is
also potentially subject to the new degradation
of service attack described in 2.2.3.
5.1.2

Figure 12 depicts the state machine. The symbol u
denotes when the timestamp of a given address is updated. These timestamps are used to generate timer
events (see below). Re.cord denotes where datagram
information (IF addresses, ports, and sequence numbers) is recorded, so that a RST can be generated
later if necessary. There are several distinct sets of
events: observed TCP packets, timer events, and administrative commands:

Operation

In addition to the address classification, synkill performs the following processing steps.
• process administrative input (asynchronollsly)
• handle expiry events (asynchronously)

1. Observed TCP packets

• handle staleness events (asynchronously)

SYN TCP packets with the SYN bit set are the
initial message of any TCP connection establishment attempt. The state machine is
designed to ignore SYNs for addresses that
are in the ne.w, good, or perfect states. For
addresses in the bad or e.vil states, a RST
packet is generated and sent.
The very first packet received from an address with its SYN bit set is moved into the
new state to indicate suspicion. As soon
as further valid TCP traffic from that address is observed (ACK, RST) the address
is moved into the good state.

• send RST for all impossible addresses (e.g., net
0.0.0.0 or 127.0.0.0)
• send ACK to complete observed SYN+ACK
connections
• send RST for all evil addresses (e.g., nets
10.0.0.0,172.16.0.0, and 192.168.0.0; see [17])
5.1.3

State Machine

After the preprocessing steps are taken, synkill
operates as a state machine (see Figure 12). The
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Figure 12: The synkill finite state machine
ACK, RST If synkill receives a valid ACK
or RST packets from an address, it means
that the host generates valid packets and
the address can be considered good. The
address is moved into the good state.

the good state to leave the good state after
no TCP traffic was observed from that address for a period of time, i.e., the staleness
period. This allows synkill to correctly
classify spoofed IF addresses as bad even if
they were once good - as long as they first
became stale.

2. Timer events
expiry An expiry event occurs if the timer associated with an address in the new state cxpires. This means that aynkill has not observed any valid TCP traffic from that address. The address is therefore moved into
the bad state and RET packets are generated and sent for all SYN packets from that
address that were observed while the address was in the new state. Ideally, the expiry timer should be much smaller than the
current 75 seconds timeout. The smaller
the chosen value the more likely it is for legitimate connections to he erroneously denied by synkill. Because RSTs arc sent
after the SYN was observed, the destination
machine will respond with a SYN+ACK
and thus trigger the third message of the
three-way handshake. This third message
(an ACK) will cause synkill to reclassify the observed address as good. Subsequent connection establishment attempts
will therefore succeed.

This can be implemented either with explicit
timer events, or with a timestamp per address
that is examined the ne),.'t time the address is
processed.

5.2

Implementation

We have implemented this algorithm in the programming language C with a Tcl/Tk graphical user interface (Sec Appendix B). The program can e:"ecute in
the foreground or as a daemon. Its output can be
redirected to syslog. Currently, the program's classification database can grow to over 47600 entries and
it garbage collects database entries if the database
is filled beyond a certain watermark. It utilizes the
Packet Capture library from the Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory, a high level interface to packet
capture systems, to make all packets on the monitored network accessible in a highly portable manner.

There is a rich set of administrative commands
to manipulate the address classification database,
staleness The notion of staleness was intro- display statistics and modify the configuration of
duced as a mechanism to allow addresses in synkill. Refer to the manual page for details.
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(Note: URL for software missing here. Not included
to facilitate blind refereeing.)

5.3

Test

1
2

Discussion

3

Defense

none
nonc
synkill
synkill
synkill
synkill

Attack Configuration
mode
delay
sec.
None
Single Addr.
10
Singlc Addr.
10
Single Addr.
1
20 Addrs.
1
No list
1

batchsize

100
100
20
2

The philosophy behind our approach was to build a
4
tool that can detect the conditions of a SYN flooding
5
attack and react appropriately to defeat, or at least
6
10
lessen the impact of, the attack. Synkill neither requires any special hardware (such as particular fire- Table 2: Swnmary of test cases used for performance
wall products), nor certain certain operating systems, evaluation of synkill
network stacks, or even modifications in the protected
end systems. Our software is highly portable, extenThis simulates a scenario where 25 hosts perform,
sible, and easily configurable.
on the average, one TCP connection establishment
In our testbed, we successfully protected a set of
attempt every two seconds. This means the accessed
hosts of a wide variety of vendors and operating sysserver must service 750 requests a minute - about
tems against the attack. Section 6 details some of
an order of magnitude more than the authors' de~
the operational characteristics of the synkill applipartmental Web server.
cation. Furthermore, the active monitor approach
allows for replication of the software to improve reliability and performance because of decentralized and
6.2 Explored Evaluation Space
distributed action.

6
6.1

We use six test cases to evaluate the perfonnance of
the synkill program. The test cases arc summarized
in Table 2. The terms mode, delay, and batch-size arc
explained in Section 3.2. They are used to characterize instances of SYN attacks.

Performance of Synkill
Experimental Evaluation

The performance of the synkill application was
evaluated using the configllIation illustrated in Figure 1. The attacker A performs a SYN flooding attack against machine D. The synkill application
nms on machine M protecting all hosts 011 the local
area network. Host S2 evaluates the accessibility ofD
in the following way: S2 starts 25 processes that attempt to establish connections to the target computer
simultaneously. Each of these processes performs one
hundred sequential attempts with a random delay between zero and four seconds. The machines utilized
for the evaluation environment are SUN Spare Ultra 1 workstations with 32 MB of RAM, running Solaris 2.5.1.

6.3

Evaluation Results

The first two test cases are included as points of reference. Test 1 executes the evaluation scripts without
D being under a SYN flooding attack. The second
test runs the evaluation scripts with D being under
attack, but without any defenses. Figures 13 and 14
show the success rates and average delays for these
two test cases.

In the second test case the attacker sends twenty
batches of one hundred spoofed SYN packets each
with a delay of ten seconds between batches. Note
that the areas marked with the letter a: correspond
to a small window of opportunity that the evaluation
Two metrics are considered during the performance
tests: 1) success rates and 2) average delays. (Note: program has when the attacked machine releases the
definitions for metrics missing here.) Upon successful first set of blocked ports. The delay in this case inconnection completion, the connection is closed im- dicates that, on the average, these were successes in
mediately. Typical TCP connections do not exhibit the first TCP retry attempt. The area marked with
this behavior. However, we are interested only in de- the letter /3 shows how once the attack has stopped
the connections succeed but only after a very large
termining how many connection establishments can
delay.
succeed under attack. To simulate maximum contention, we performed all connection establishment
In test cases 3 and 4. synkill protects the target
attempts against a single port on the server.
machine against a single address SYN flooding attack
11
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Figure 13: Test case 1: Connection establishment success rates and average delays for normal operation of
D (without attack).
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Figure 14: Test case 2: Connedion establishment success rates and average delays while D is temporarily
under attack, without active defense by synkill.
of different delays and batch-sizes. In both cases similar performance results can be observed. Synkill
learns the spoofed address, classifies it as bad, and
releases half-open connections from that address as
soon as they are observed. All legitimate connections
succeed, and only small delays are observed.

Test case 5 evaluates access to a machine under
SYN flooding attack using a list of 20 spoofed addresses, 400 batches, a batch-size of 2 and a delay
of 1 second. Figure 17 shows the success rates and
average delays in this test case. Note that the only
noticeable effect the attack has on the machine protected by synkill is a small increase in the delay experienced during connection establishment. A load
increase of the attacked machine is responsible for
this delay.
Finally, test case 6 consists of evaluating the performance of synkill during an attack in which spoofed

addresses are not repeated. The attack script sends
one thousand batches of ten SYN packets each, with
a delay of one second, using a new address for every
batch. In some sense this is the worst case scenario
for synkill, because it cannot utilize its learned
knowledge of bad addresses and reset future connections that use the bad addresses as spoofed source
addresses.
The measurements of this test case are displayed in
Figure 18. We observed considerable delays and some
failures in connection establishment attempts. They
happened because the attacked machine ran out of
swap space and empty process table entries to handle further incoming connections. For this attack the
load in the attacked machine increased dramatically
and at one point had ten processes waiting for attention in the ready queue. These observations suggest
that even better performance of synkill can be ex-
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Figure 15: Test case 3: Connection establishment success rates and average delays.
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Figure 16: Test case 4: Connection establishment success rates and average delays.
pected if the host-based configuration optimizations
discussed in Section 4.1.1 are used in conjunction
with synkill.

7

Future Improvements

Synkill could respond to this improved attack by
keeping state about all observed TCP connections on
the LAN. That would make successful SYN flooding
for an attacker as hard as sequence number prediction attacks. Furthermore, this approach would facilitate the detection of other classes of network based
attacks (see e.g., [3]).

This section describes future improvements to
synkill that would make the tool more effective

against improved SYN flooding attacks.

7.1

connection, thus avoiding port flooding, the attacker
may still be able to start a large number of server
processes in the target machine. This again leads to
the degradation of service attack described in Section 2.2.3.

Connection State Tracking
7.2

Currently, it is possible for an attacker to "teach"
synkill good addresses that are in fact spoofed, by
spoofing ACK or RST packets. That could be exploited to first teach synkill a spoofed address and
then use that same address for a SYN flooding attack. Although synkill artificially completes each

Multiple-network Monitoring

Currently, synkill is implemented to monitor a single network interface. It may be desirable to allow
the tool to monitor several network interfaces simultaneously, thus allowing the sharing of the acquired
13
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Figure 18: Test case 6: Connection establishment success rates and average delays.
address classification database.

7.3

dict the most likely arrival time of the next spoofed
SYN packet. All SYN packets that fit into the predicted arrival times would be considered spoofed and
immediately reset. The obvious response of the attacker will be to vary the delay between successive
SYN packets.

Attack Interval and Source Address Prediction

The basic idea of this approach is to protect against
attacks based on timing or random number generator
artifacts of the attack scripts, and not the generic
attack method.
OUf analysis of SYN flooding attack software
showed that the delays between successive SYN packets in one batch, and between successive batches are
almost constant. This same timing behavior can be
observed at the targeted hosts, because all spoofed
packets travel the same route over the internetwork
and in a stable internetwork only little jitter is introduced.
The synkill software could therefore measure inter arrival times and use statistical models to pre-

Similarly, the random numbers used in many pub·
lished exploitation routines are generated by cryptographically weak standard library routines. They
do not follow good cryptographic practices as described in [7, 10, 12]. We could implement a number of algorithms that automatically detect and predict pseudo random number sequences generated by
simple common generators and use predicted pseudorandom IP addresses to identify malicious packets
quickly. Again, there is an obvious countermeasure
on the side of the attacker to harden attack implementations against these artifacts.
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7.4

Trusted Address Space Ranges

TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks,
September 1996. CA-96:2l.

Once the source address filtering mechanisms discussed in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2 become more widely
implemented a limited IF address space will be available for spoofed source addresses. Synkill could incorporate information about these secured address
space ranges and automatically include them in its
address preprocessing steps.
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[5J Elizabeth Corcoran. Hackers strike at N.Y. Internet Access Company. The Wa.~hin9ton Post,
Sep. 12, 1996.
[6] daemon9, route, and infinity. Project neptune.
Phrack Magazine, 7(48), 1996.
[7] Donald E. Eastlake, Stephen D. Crocker, and
Jeffrey 1. Schiller. RFC-1750 Randomness Recommendatiom for Security. Network Working
Group, December 1994.

Conclusions

This paper has described and analyzed a network
based denial of service attack, called SYN flooding.
It has contributed a detailed analysis of this attack
and a description and discussion of existing and proposed countermeasures. FUrthermore, it has introduced a new solution approach, explained its design,
and evaluated its performance.
The de.<;ign is based on the philosophy that this ac·
tive anomaly detection tool can detect the conditions
of a SYN flooding attack and react appropriately to
defeat, or at least lessen the impact of, an attack.
Synkill neither requires any special hardware (such
as particular firewall products), nor certain operating systems, network stacks, or even modifications in
the protected end systems. Our software is highly
protable, extensible, and easily configurable.
Our evaluation of the tool shows that synkill is
capable of effectively protecting all machines on a
LAN against a wide range of attack configurations.
Many of the lessons learned from this study can be
applied to the protection against other denial of service attacks.
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A

TCP State Machine

Figure 19 depicts the TCP state machine.:}
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Screenshot xsynkill

Note: The final version of thc paper will contain
a screenshot of the aUI of synkill. To facilitate
the blind refereeing of our submission, wc have not
included the screenshot in this version of the paper.
It contains information identifying the (affiliation of
the) authors.

JCourtesy of Douglas E. Comer, [21.
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